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Abstract  
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1. Introduction. 
Many papers have analyzed in recent years the relationship between market openness and some 
performance variables. Most of them have focused on assessing the productivity heterogeneity among 
firms. There are at least three channels throughout which openness could have effects on firms’ 
efficiency: scale economies, dynamic efficiency gains due to reallocation effects and access to foreign 
technology embodied in imported goods and services. Additionally, the contact with foreign firms in 
domestic and foreign markets could also improve firm efficiency by means of spillover effects.  
 
It is likely that markups are also affected by market integration. On the one hand, markups could vary 
insofar as changes in efficiency were not fully transmitted to prices. On the other hand, changes in 
competitive pressures due to easier access to domestic markets by foreign providers can also affect 
domestic firm markups. This is the classical argument supported by the Import as Market Discipline 
hypothesis (IMD henceforth), whose basic prediction is that trade openness increases the number of 
product varieties available and the elasticity of demand that domestic producers face. Many papers 
have analyzed such hypothesis for a long time (see, for example, Levinhson (1993) and Harrison 
(1994)) and, though not unanimously, most of them conclude that markups of domestic firms are 
negatively associated with foreign competitive pressures.  
  
The IMD hypothesis assumes that imports are final goods and, presumably, almost perfect substitutes 
to domestic production. In such a way, it does not take into account a main feature of current trade 
flows, namely that a large proportion of international trade is comprised by imports of intermediate 
goods and services, a phenomenon known as offshoring.1 Though offshoring has been widely 
documented in theoretical and empirical literature (Helpman, 2006), its effect on the IMD hypothesis 
has been very scarcely considered. It seems natural to expect that, insofar as those intermediate 
purchases indicate the slicing of the value chain aiming to obtain efficiency advantages, their negative 
effect on markups were smaller or, even, non-significant. To our knowledge, only Egger and Egger 
(2004) have modelled the Import as Market Discipline hypothesis distinguishing between intermediate 
                                                 
1 The definition of offshoring is not homogeneous in literature. Here it is defined as the purchase of intermediate 
goods from foreign providers, irrespective of the ownership links between the domestic importer and the foreign 
supplier.  
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and final goods. Boullhol et al. (2006) and Abraham et al. (2009) are recent empirical applications 
following this argument. 
 
In this paper we revisit the IMD hypothesis including such a distinction between the types of imported 
goods. With that aim, we estimate firm-level markups using the methodology suggested by Roeger 
(1995). Its main advantage is that it allows us to estimate markups avoiding the simultaneity problem 
between inputs and productivity shocks that emerges in the Hall (1988) framework, which has been 
extensively used to approach markups.  
 
A common feature of both the Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) methodologies is the assumption of 
perfect competition in input markets. However, as Crépon et al. (1999) point out, it may cause an 
underestimation of markups, due to the omission of the share of rents captured by workers. To include 
it, they extend the Hall approach by introducing an efficient bargaining model between workers and 
firms. In this paper we use a similar approach, though in the Roeger (1995) empirical framework, to 
consider labour market imperfections in a joint estimation of markups and union bargaining power.  
 
This paper contributes to literature in several ways. Firstly, we estimate simultaneously markups and 
workers’ bargaining power. In doing so, we avoid potential downward biases that were previously 
mentioned while combining two strands of empirical literature: those papers that have jointly analyzed 
product and labour imperfections within the Hall approach and those that have used the Roeger 
empirical approach in a context of labour markets with perfect competition. This general setting allows 
us to estimate the effects of import competition on both markups and union bargaining power. With 
respect to the latter, many authors have pointed out that increased market integration erodes the 
power of domestic trade unions (e.g., Rodrik, 1997). In that respect, there is an obvious effect of 
import competition on labour rents: insofar as globalization reduces economic rents (the effect that the 
IMD hypothesis predicts), both profits and labour rents are directly affected. The key question is 
therefore whether it also affects workers’ bargaining power and, consequently, to the distribution of 
rents between employers and employees.  
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Secondly, we test the Import as Market Discipline hypothesis distinguishing between final and 
intermediates imports. As was previously mentioned, average estimated effects could be downward 
biased if intermediate imports are a relevant share of total imports. In that context, we also discuss the 
effect of offshoring on the relationship between import competition and union bargaining power. 
Additionally, the paper addresses the role of product differentiation in the relationship between trade 
openness and markups, under the hypothesis that import pressures should be more intensive when 
product differentiation is small and imported goods are closer substitutes of domestically produced 
goods. 
 
Finally, the paper uses both a traditional approach with panel data regressions and, also, firm-specific 
regressions. The latter allows us to analyze the distribution of estimated parameters and it is a non-
standard approach to control unobserved heterogeneity across firms. That is possible because we use 
a relatively long firm panel dataset and we take advantage of the estimation procedure, which allows 
us a straightforward identification of markups with very few explanatory variables. 
 
The data refer to Spanish manufacturers during the period 1990-2005, which offer an interesting case 
to jointly address product and labour market imperfections in the context of the globalization process. 
On the one hand, Spain is a medium-size economy which has experienced an accelerated trade 
integration since the late eighties in the context of the enlargement and deepening processes of the 
European Union. Immediately after joining the EU in 1986, Spanish firms affronted the Single Market 
process and the adjustments to comply with the third phase of the European Monetary Union. The 
consequence of those changes, in a general setting of increased globalization, was a steady rise in 
openness (trade over GDP) from 37% in 1990 to 59% in 2006. On the other hand, the Spanish labour 
market is one of the most highly regulated in all developed countries, with high statutory protection 
and union power (see Botero et al., 2004).  
 
The main results of the paper are the following. First, we obtain a predicted negative effect of imports 
on firm markups. Second, the negative effect of import propensity is larger the more final-goods 
oriented imports and the more homogeneous the type of goods elaborated by firms. On the contrary, 
intermediate imports decrease slightly or do not affect the corresponding markups. These results point 
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out that, as was expected, pro-competitive effects of imports are more relevant in the context of final 
goods, while for intermediate imports pro-efficiency effects partially outweigh the pro-competitive 
effect. Third, we obtain positive evidence of union bargaining power in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry.  Consequently, estimated markups are downward biased when perfect competition in labour 
market is assumed. As in the case of markups, union bargaining power is smaller for those importers 
of final goods that produce homogeneous goods.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical background and the 
empirical approach used to estimate markups. Section 3 describes the database and definition of 
variables. Section 4 discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our final conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical framework. 
2.1 Background literature. 
The Import as Market Discipline hypothesis has received strong support in the context of Industrial 
Organization literature (Tybout, 2003). Most of the theoretical models predict that trade liberalization 
increases the number of product varieties available and the elasticity of demand that domestic producers 
face, which implies a decrease of markups. The empirical evidence with industry-aggregated data 
confirms this prediction. Using economic profits over sales as an approach for price cost margin, the ratio 
of imports to domestic consumption is usually negatively correlated with the profitability of domestic 
sales, especially when domestic concentration is high. The results with firm-level panel data show the 
same results: industries with higher exposure to foreign competition are associated with lower price-cost 
margins. For example, using the Hall approach, Levinsohn (1993) found that the markups of Turkish 
manufacturing firms were reduced due to increased exposure to foreign competition2.  
 
Additionally, many theoretical models with imperfectly competitive product market predict that increased 
exposure to international trade can have effects on the efficiency and profitability of domestic firms. With 
respect to efficiency, the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) has stimulated extensive literature that 
connects the decision to export with intra-industry heterogeneity in productivity and size. A main 
characteristic of such an approach is that the demand side is modelled by using CES preferences 
                                                 
2 Following a similar approach, Harrison (1994) also tested the effect of trade policy reforms for profits and productivity in The 
Ivory Coast. She found that market power is higher in sectors with lower import penetration and larger tariffs.  
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which, as usual, generate constant markups. Though it is not the perfect competition framework that 
was present in traditional models of international trade, constant markups are at odds with observed 
heterogeneity across firms. Many other recent papers that build on this tradition, such as Yeaple 
(2005) and Bernard et al. (2007), also assume constant markups. 3 
 
More recently, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) have proposed an alternative framework that establishes 
predictions on the distribution (average and variance) of some performance variables. Their model is 
based on a monopolistically competitive framework with heterogeneous firms and endogenous 
differences in the ‘toughness’ of competition across countries, reflected by the number and average 
productivity of competing firms. This model follows many features of the Melitz (2003) approach.  but it 
has two characteristics that lead to more realistic predictions about markup distribution. Firstly, the 
demand side is specified using a linear demand system with horizontal product differentiation.4 It 
allows authors to incorporate endogenous markups. Secondly, trade operates through an increase of 
product market competition, instead of through the increased labour market competition channel. 
Firms respond to this tougher product market competition by setting a lower markup that outweighs 
the selection effect according to which the most productive firms survive and set higher markups. This 
paper predicts that in a context of market openness surviving firms are more productive and set higher 
markups, but the average markup is reduced. In other words, the pro-competitive effect outweighs the 
selection effect.   
 
The Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model enriches the classical IMD hypothesis, integrating in a unified 
framework the selection and reallocation effects among heterogeneous firms. In that approach market 
openness is defined by country size and trade costs among countries. The impact of openness 
depends on the degree of substitutability among varieties: the larger it is, the larger the negative effect 
of imports on domestic markups. However, there is not an assessment of the type of import flows that 
qualify such openness. In that sense, it is relevant to take into account that a main characteristic of 
current trade flows is that a large percentage of them is made up of intermediate goods (Hummels et 
al, 2001). A complementary strand of literature has analyzed this issue more carefully. Specifically, 
                                                 
3 Bernard et al (2003) propose an alternative approach in which markups are not fixed across firms, though its distribution is 
fixed in other characteristics of the model. 
4 Specifically, they incorporate endogenous markups using the linear demand system developed by Ottaviano et al (2002). In 
this approach, price elasticity not only depends on the level of product differentiation, but also on average prices and the 
number of competing varieties. 
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Antràs and Helpman (2004) develop a model where production entails relationship-specific 
investments by both the final-goods producers and suppliers. Such relationships evolve in an 
incomplete contracting setting. Their model analyzes the choices between integration and outsourcing 
and between domestic and foreign sourcing. As in Melitz (2003), the model predicts an association 
between firm productivity and the degree of involvement in international activities, so that more 
productive firms outsource in foreign markets, while less productive firms outsource domestically.5 
That prediction has received strong empirical support. Tomiura (2007), Altomonte et al (2008) and 
Fariñas and Martín (2010), among others, find empirical support for the positive effects of imports on 
efficiency, and that such an effect is bigger for intermediate imports. 6 In a complementary way, Amiti 
and Konings (2007) show that reducing tariffs on final and intermediate goods generates productivity 
gains for Indonesian industries and that these gains are bigger for imported inputs. 
 
The relevance of intermediate imports in current international trade flows suggests that to consider all 
imports as final goods would underestimate the relevance of the IMD hypothesis. In fact, there is no 
reason why intermediate imports should depress domestic markups. Intermediate imports allow firms 
to optimize available resources, contracting out those processes that are less efficient when there is 
in-house provision. Of course, it does not imply necessarily that firms engage in international trade 
flows. However, dramatic advances in technology have substantially reduced transaction costs (e.g., 
search costs of an adequate external provider) and stimulated trade across larger distances. Egger 
and Egger (2004) have dealt with this issue by proposing a model that predicts a positive effect of 
offshoring on markups. Such a hypothesis is supported by using an industrial panel dataset (NACE 
three-digit level) in which price-cost margins are approached with an accounting measurement.  
 
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with markups assumes perfect competition in 
the labour market. Some papers have relaxed that assumption. Bughin (1991, 1993 and 1996) 
analyzed the relationship between labour markets institutions, particularly trade unions, and product 
market power. Later, Crépon et al. (1999) extended the Hall approach to estimate markups 
                                                 
5 The model also incorporates the decision about outsourcing or vertical integration following the Grossman and Helpman 
(2002) approach. Antras and Helpman (2008) have generalized that model by allowing the degree of contractibility to vary  
across inputs and countries. 
6 The relationship between domestic outsourcing and productivity is not clearly established in the empirical papers. However, 
the evidence seems to be more convincing for offshoring. See Bjerring (2006) for a survey, and Görg et al (2008) for an 
empirical analysis with plant level data. 
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considering an efficient bargaining model between firms and unions based on MacDonald and Solow 
(1981). This allows them to propose an equation where markups and bargaining power are jointly 
estimated, with the advantage that it does not require measuring the opportunity cost of labour. Using 
a balanced panel of French firms, they find that ignoring imperfect competition in the labour market 
produces an underestimation in the price cost margin. Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere and 
Mairesse (2008) confirm these results for two unbalanced panels of Belgium and French firms, 
respectively. Additionally, some papers have used this methodology to test the pro-competitive effects 
of imports both on the product and labour markets. Specifically, Boulhol et al (2006) estimate markups 
and workers’ bargaining power in the UK manufacturing sectors. In a second stage they relate trade 
variables with the parameters previously estimated. They find that imports from developed countries, 
which are mostly intra-industry trade, have contributed to the decline in both markups and workers’ 
bargaining power. However, that pro-competitive effect does not appear for imports from developing 
countries.  
 
The connection between trade and labour market bargaining has been explored since the eighties 
(Grossman (1984) and Mezzeetti and Dinapoulos (1991), among others). Insofar as globalization 
reduces economic rents (i.e., the IMD hypothesis), both profits and labour rents are directly affected. 
However, the key question is whether it also affects workers’ bargaining power and, therefore, the 
distribution of rents between them and employees. The reason would be similar to that of product 
markets: increasing access to foreign goods implies more competition of foreign workers. It tightens 
domestic labour markets and reduces union bargaining power, especially in a context where the inter-
industry labour market is reduced. It is likely that the precise effect of decreasing union bargaining power 
on wages and employment depends on specific characteristics of labour market institutions, such as the 
scope and structure of the bargaining process (e.g., the predominant degree of 
centralization/decentralization) or union preferences. In that context, Dumont et al (2006) extend the 
Bughin approach to estimate in a two step procedure not only labour bargaining power, but also union 
preferences between wages and employment. They analyze differences among five European 
countries and find that internationalization seems to have a negative impact on the bargaining power 
of unions.  
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Additionally, the effect of import competition on union bargaining power may be larger the more 
relevant imports of intermediate goods are. In such a case employees deal with the fact that the firm 
outsources some parts of the productive process to foreign countries. This is clear in some highly 
internationalized sectors such as the automotive industry, where competition among subsidiaries in 
different countries is a main factor to explain union bargaining power. However, the negative effect of 
final imports on union bargaining power should not be dismissed either. Imports of final goods act as a 
substitute for domestic production in goods such as apparels and footwear, and also erode the power 
of domestic trade unions.  
 
To our knowledge, Abraham et al (2008) is the only paper that analyzes the effect of outsourcing on 
product and labour market discipline with firm data. They use the Olley and Pakes (2006) correction to 
deal with the problem of the endogeneity that emerges with the Hall approach and present different 
approaches to measure globalization, namely import penetration, outsourcing and foreign direct 
investment. They also find that globalization reduces both markups and union bargaining power, but 
only when imports come from low-wage countries. Additionally, the results show that the growth in 
outsourcing is positively correlated with both product and labour market imperfections, while the level 
of outsourcing does not have a statistically significant effect.  
 
2.2 Empirical approach. 
 
In contrast to productivity, markups are not easy to identify. In an ideal world, researchers would 
observe prices and marginal costs. However, marginal costs are difficult to approach and it is very 
unlikely to obtain information on price levels. Though researchers cannot observe either of its two 
components, some methods have been suggested to estimate markups. A first alternative is to use a 
structural approach with a specific cost function, cost shares and price equations, which allows us to 
estimate marginal costs and markups. Its main drawback is that very detailed information is required in 
order to apply this methodology. This approach was used by Bernstein and Mohnen (1991) with 
industrial data, and by Moreno and Rodriguez (2004, 2010) by taking advantage of the availability of 
price variations at the firm level in an analysis of markups for exporting firms.   
 
Roeger (1995) was interested in knowing whether the differences between primal and dual 
productivity measures can be explained by imperfect competition. As he pointed-out, a by-product of 
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the analysis is that it provides an alternative method to estimate markups. We briefly describe that 
approach later on, departing from a standard production function that is linearly homogeneous in the 
inputs. In that context, and under imperfect competition, the output growth rate can be expressed as 
(Hall, 1988):  
( )L M Kit it it it it it it it ity s l s m s kµ θ= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +                                          (1) 
where , ,it it ity l m  and itk  are the growth rate of output, labour, materials and capital, respectively; 
j
j it it
it
it it
P J
s
P Y
⋅= ⋅  is the cost share of input j (j=L,M,K) in sales, and 
j
itP  ( itP ) stands for the prices of inputs 
(output). Additionally, itθ  is the productivity growth and itµ  is the price marginal cost margin: 'itit
it
P
C
µ = .  
 
Equation (1) can be rewritten to decompose the Solow residual (SRit) into two terms: the markup 
component and the productivity (technological) term:   
 
( )(1 ) (1 )L M L Mit it it it it it it it it it it it it itSR y s l s m s s k y kβ β θ= − ⋅ − ⋅ − − − ⋅ = − + −            (2) 
 
where market power is measured by the Lerner index 11it
it
β µ= − . Some papers have used equations 
(1) or (2) to estimate markups. The main problem that emerges in that context is the expected 
correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels, a serious problem given that it 
is very difficult to find exogenous instruments in this context. The approaches suggested by Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and Levinhson and Petrin (2003) introduce alternative ways to deal with the endogeneity 
of productivity shocks7 By contrast, Roeger (1995) proposes a more simple approach to circumvent 
this problem, based on taking advantage of common components in the primal and dual (price-based) 
Solow Residual. Departing from the cost minimization problem and imposing constant returns to scale, 
the latter is defined as: 
(1 ) ( ) (1 )L l M M L M K Kit it it it it it it it it it it it it itDSR s p s p s s p p p pβ β θ= ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅ − = − − + −         (3)                          
 
 
where , ,l m kit it itp p p  and itp  are the growth rates of wages, prices of intermediates inputs, the rental price 
of capital and the output price, respectively.    
 
Subtracting equation (3) from equation (2), we obtain:  
 
                                                 
7 Abraham et al. (2009) and Dobbeleare and Mairesse (2008) are two recent empirical examples. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1L l M m L M k kit it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it ity p s l p s m p s s k p y p k pβ ⎡ ⎤+ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − − − ⋅ + = + − +⎣ ⎦           (4) 
In equation (4) the term which refers to the growth of productivity is eliminated and, as a consequence, 
the problem of correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels disappears. In 
this sense, the Lerner index itβ  can be estimated consistently.8 In this context, information 
requirements are limited to sales ( it ity p⋅ ), labour cost ( lit itl p⋅ ), the nominal value of intermediate 
consumption ( mit itm p⋅  ) and the nominal value of capital services ( kit itk p⋅ ).   
 
To simplify notation, we denote the left-hand side in equation (4) as dYit, which can be interpreted as 
the difference between the growth rate of sales and a weighted average of the growth rate of factor 
costs, weighted by their respective share in sales. We denote the term in brackets in the right-hand 
side of the equation as dXit, which can be interpreted as the growth rate of sales per value of capital. 
Then, the equation to be estimated is:  
it it it itdY dX uβ= +                                               (5a) 
 
The specification of equation (5a) incorporates some assumptions to be considered. The first issue is 
that the constant returns to scale assumption could bias upwardly (downwardly) the estimated levels 
(changes) in the markup.9 With firm data, however, this is not a serious problem because usually the 
constant returns to scale assumption is not rejected, or only very slightly decreasing returns to scale 
are obtained (Moreno and Rodriguez, 2004). A second assumption is that factors of production can be 
adjusted instantaneously. Roeger (1995) showed that the difference between the primal and the dual 
residuals is cyclical in the presence of excess capacity and also if labour hoarding is present in 
recession. A variable that approaches the excess capacity can be introduced in the estimation to 
control that problem. In the case of labour hoarding, firms use temporal workers to maximize the 
utilization of the labour force throughout the business cycle. Another reason for a non-zero uit is 
related to measurement errors, particularly with respect to inputs. As he points out, the measurement 
error related to labour is not relevant insofar as this variable appears only on the left side of equation 
(4). As we will explain in the next Section, we believe that our approaches to labour (that uses hours 
effectively worked instead of the number of employees) and capital stock (that uses the inventory 
                                                 
8 It does not mean that the markup is unaffected by potential variables that influence efficiency. In particular, insofar as 
differences in marginal costs across firms are affected by import activity, as recent evidence suggests, the parameter itβ  will 
capture that effect. 
9 For a more extensive discussion, see Konings et al. (2005). 
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permanent method to elaborate capital stocks and rents at the firm level instead of fixed assets) 
reduces to a large extent the potential measurement errors. 
 
Finally, both the Roeger (1995) and Hall (1988) approaches assume perfect competition in the labour 
market. However, if wages are not the result of a huge number of interactions between individual 
workers and firms, but coalitions emerge in both sides, observed wages are no longer equal to 
marginal productivities. That gap will be larger the larger is bargaining power of trade unions. As was 
suggested above, some recent papers have addressed this issue introducing imperfections in this 
market.  
 
Crépon et al. (1999) included the efficient bargaining model into the Hall (1988) approach assuming 
that firms and workers bargain simultaneously over both wages and employment. The objective of the 
union is to maximize the amount of rent sharing, ( )L Lit it itl p p− , where Litp   is the negotiated wage and 
L
itp  
is the alternative or reservation wage.  The firm objective is to maximize its short run 
profit: L Mit it it it it itp y p l p m⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ .10 The Nash solution to the bargaining problem is given by the 
maximization of a weighted average of both objective functions, where the weight associated to the 
union objective function is the union bargaining power. Departing from the first order conditions of the 
optimization problem, the elasticity of output with respect to labour is
 
( ), 11itY L L L Mitit it it it itits s s
φε µ µ φ= ⋅ + ⋅ + −− , where itφ  represents the union bargaining power. As can be 
seen, labour cost share no longer equals output elasticities of labour divided by the markup when 
worker bargaining power is different from zero. If it is not properly considered, estimated markups 
would be biased. Crépon et al (2002) show that, in this context, the markup also includes the rent that 
goes to the workforce and must be interpreted as the ratio of price over marginal cost where this is 
evaluated at the reservation wage instead of the bargained wage. 
 
 
We simultaneously consider imperfect competition in product and labour markets under the Roeger 
(1995) methodology, using the Crepón et al (1999) approach to the efficient bargaining model. To our 
knowledge, Estrada (2009) is the only paper that uses this approach to estimate markups and union 
                                                 
10 Crépon et al. (1999) assume that only labour is the variable input factor. Crépon et al. (2002), Dobbelaere and Mairesse 
(2008) and Abraham et al. (2009)  also introduce materials as variable inputs.  
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bargaining power for some industries in seven developed countries. Therefore, using the labour-output 
elasticity defined above, both the Solow residual (SRit) and its price-based (DSRit) now have the 
following expressions, where a new term that measures union bargaining power has been added:  
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) 1 (1 )1L M L M I Iitit it it it it it it it it it it it L M it it it ititSR y s l s m s s k y k s s l k
φβ β θφ= − ⋅ − ⋅ − − − ⋅ = − + + − ⋅ − + −−     (2b) 
( ) ( )(1 ) 1 ( ) (1 )1L l M M L M K I I Kitit it it it it it it it it L M l k it it it it ititDSR s p s p s s p p s s p p p p
φ β β θφ= ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅ − + + − ⋅ − = − − + −−    (3b)                        
 
Subtracting equation (3b) from equation (2b), we obtain:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
L l M m L M k
it it it it it it it it it it it it
k L M k lit
it it it it it it it it it it it
it
y p s l p s m p s s k p
y p k p s s k p l p
φβ φ
+ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − − − ⋅ + =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + + − − ⋅ + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦−                 
(4b) 
In equation (4b), in addition to the Lerner index ( itβ ), a new term allows us to estimate the bargaining 
market power ( itφ ). As was previously pointed out, the markup (in this case the Lerner index) should 
be interpreted as an average markup evaluated at the competitive wage level. Denoting the second 
term of the right-hand side in equation (4b) by dNit , which can be interpreted as the growth rate of 
nominal capital per worked hour, the equation to be estimated is therefore:  
it it it it it itdY dX dN uβ γ= + +                                               (5b) 
where 
1
it
it
it
φγ φ= − . The empirical strategy consists of testing firstly the IMD hypothesis under perfect 
competition in the labour market (equation (5a)) and, later, considering the extended model (equation 
(5b)). It allows us to evaluate the magnitude of changes in the markup when the standard assumption 
of perfect competition in the labour market is no longer considered.  
 
This methodology allows us to estimate both margins and bargaining power in a very simple way while 
avoiding endogeneity problems related to the measurement of productivity. Additionally, it allows us to 
use a flexible parameterization in order to explain the observed heterogeneity of mark-ups among 
firms by incorporating some explanatory variables. Specifically, our main objective is to analyze how 
import activity is related to heterogeneity in mark-ups and bargaining power across firms. With that 
purpose, we interact the right-side variables of equation (5a) with the import intensity (IMP), defined as 
imports over total sales. This variable is measured using both firm-level data and industry averages. 
An interaction term that classifies firms according to the type of imports (Type) is also included to test 
the hypothesis that final and intermediate imports affect margins in different ways. Finally, other 
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interactions related to the degree of product homogeneity, market competition and capacity utilization 
are also introduced. As was previously mentioned, the latter controls for the potential bias that 
emerges from the cyclical behaviour of margins in the presence of excess capacity. Therefore, 
equation (5a) can be written as:  
 
1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it it it it it itdY dX dX IMP dX IMP Type dX Other Variables CU uβ β β β β= + × + × × + × + +          (6a) 
 
When the assumption of perfect competition in labour markets is relaxed, equation (6a) is enlarged to 
include interactions between dNit, the import ratio (IMP) and intermediate inputs. 
 
       
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it
dY dX dX IMP dX IMP Type dX Other Variables CU
dN dN IMP dN IMP Type dN Other Variables u
β β β β β
γ γ γ γ
= + × + × × + × +
+ + × + × × + × +           (6b) 
 
Some papers have used this approach to analyze the effect of trade liberalization on markups.  For 
example, Konings et al (2005) analyze how privatization and competitive pressure can affect price-
cost margins in a panel data of Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing firms. They find that import 
penetration negatively affects markup, but only in sectors where product market concentration is high. 
However in a more competitive sector, the effect is reversed. They explain that result pointing out that 
international competitive pressure depresses prices but also reduces marginal cost. In the case of 
competitive sectors, the second effect prevails: foreign competition leads firms to engage in more 
restructuring and innovating activities, which makes them more cost-efficient. Using the same 
methodology, Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) present evidence about the positive impact of 
antidumping protection on the market power of import-competing domestic firms in a majority of 
manufactured sectors of the EU. Finally, Altomonte and Barattieri (2007) also test the IMD hypothesis 
with this methodology, but their results are less conclusive. They only find evidence of pro-competitive 
gains from trade in some industries and explain the positive relationship obtained in other sectors by 
firms adjusting their product mix in response to trade pressures.  
 
3. Data. 
Firm data are taken from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a survey sponsored 
by the Spanish Ministry of Industry and carried out by the Fundación SEPI. The sampling scheme of 
this survey is conducted for each manufacturing NACE class (two-digit) level. Companies employing 
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between 10 and 200 employees are chosen by a random sampling scheme and the rate of 
participation is around 4%. For firms employing more than 200 employees, the rate of participation is 
about 60%. The sample considered is an unbalanced panel of about 2000 manufacturing firms for the 
period 1990-2005.  
 
The set of variables included in the production function includes production (yit), number of hours 
effectively worked during the year (lit), intermediate consumption (mit) and capital input (kit). Hours 
effectively worked are measured as the sum of the normal working time and overtime minus the non-
worked hours, while intermediate consumption is defined as the sum of purchases and external 
services, minus the variation in the stock of purchases. We measure kit using the net capital stock for 
equipment, calculated by using the perpetual inventory formula. The rental price of capital is 
calculated as the long-run debt interest rate paid by the firm ( iti ) minus the change rate of prices of 
capital goods ( Eitπ ) plus equipment goods depreciation ( itδ ), multiplied by the investment goods price 
index ( Etp ). The other prices refer to labour costs per employee (
l
itp ) and the price index for 
intermediate consumption ( mitp ). The latter is calculated as a Paasche index, weighting the price 
variations of raw materials, energy and services purchased by surveyed firms. It is expected that the 
empirical approaches for labour using the number of effective worked hours (instead of the number of 
workers) and for capital stock using a precise measurement based on the permanent inventory 
methodology (instead of book value of fixed assets), jointly with the availability of firm-level information 
of price variations, reduces the traditional sources of measurement errors in this type of estimations.  
 
The database includes information about the volume of imports for each firm and year, but it does not 
contain an explicit question about the type of imported goods, whether final or intermediate. However, 
each firm provides information about the percentage of sales of commercialized products not 
elaborated by the firm and that come from abroad. Additionally, importing firms inform about the 
percentage of imports coming from foreign companies with which they have commercialization and 
distribution agreements or which participate in the firm’s capital. We define these imports as linked. 
When they exist, firms also declare if such imports refer to products that are similar to those items 
produced by them. Though this set of information does not indicate explicitly whether imports refer to 
intermediate or final goods, it can be combined to classify those situations in which import flows can 
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be described as intermediate or final goods. Specifically, we define final imports as those situations in 
which either there are no linked imports or linked-imported goods are similar to those produced by the 
firm. We assume that in the rest of situations firms import intermediate goods that are transformed in 
the productive process. Finally, we consider intermediate imports for a subsample of firms that import 
from foreign companies with commercialization and distribution agreements, al long as these imported 
goods are not similar to those elaborated by them. We define this subset as linked intermediate 
goods. The Appendix provides additional details about the construction of variables.  
 
Following the standard convention, we name intermediate imports as offshoring.11 Though there is no 
consensus about this term, we consider that it includes both intra-firm international outsourcing and 
arm’s-length trade. Unfortunately, to disentangle these links between offshoring and intra-firm trade is 
very difficult and very few countries have the type of highly disaggregated information required.  
 
Table 1 shows (columns A and D) the percentage of importers and the import ratio (excluding non-
importers) in 1990-2005. As can be seen, the proportion of importing firms has increased by about 10 
percentual points over the period. The import ratio has also increased slightly, by about 4 points. In 
both cases such an increase occurred in the nineties, while they have remained very stable since 
2000. As can be seen in column B, almost 20% of firms over the period are final importers.  They 
represent 30% of importing firms. Their average import ratio (18.3) is 3.6 points larger than the 
average ratio of all importers. Additionally, these firms show an increase in the intensity of import flows 
over the period. The proportion of firms importing intermediate goods (offshoring) has increased from 
40.5% to 45.8% between 1991 and 2005. The intermediate imports have increased at a bigger rate 
than sales. As result, the import ratio has increased more than 3 points. Finally, the average 
percentage of firms with linked intermediate imports is about 7% of all firms (10.7% of importers). 
These firms are intensive importers: import intensity is almost ten points bigger than the average 
import ratio for all firms during this period.    
 
An additional question to deal with refers to whether competitive pressures of imports differ according 
to the degree of product differentiation. To address this issue, we use a binary variable that takes 
                                                 
11 Of course, offshoring can refer to goods and service trade. Unfortunately, the lack of adequate data prevents us 
the analysis of service offshoring. 
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value one if the product sold by the firm is highly standardized and zero otherwise. This variable is 
elaborated using individual information provided by firms. Therefore it may be a better approach to the 
specific characteristics of products elaborated by the firm than product-aggregated classifications. 
Insofar as this variable can be negatively correlated with demand price elasticity, its effect over 
markups should be negative. Finally, we test if the IMD hypothesis differs according to market 
competition. Two variables are considered with this aim. The first one indicates the market share that 
the firm declares. The second one measures the concentration ratio (CR4), elaborated with market 
shares of four larger competitors, according to the information provided by the firm itself. The 
disadvantage of the latter variable is that the number of available observations is lower, because firms 
have to identify the market share of their main competitors (see Appendix for definition of variables). 
 
 
 
4. Results. 
In this section we present the results of estimating the equation (6a) and (6b) with different sets of 
explanatory variables. Two complementary approaches are used to estimate the markup which, as we 
mentioned above, is measured as a Lerner index. Firstly, a standard panel approach combining firm 
and time dimensions. Secondly, individual regressions for each firm that allows us to obtain firm-
specific markups ( iβ ). That is possible because the Roeger approach only requires one explanatory 
variable, assuming that variables in equation (5a) are properly elaborated. In this latter case we focus 
our attention on the distribution of the firm-level estimated markups according to different firm 
characteristics. 
 
4.1 The IMD hypothesis without controlling for union bargaining power.  
We start by estimating equation (6a), that is, without controlling for the bargaining power of the 
employees. Tables 2 to 5 show the estimation results with different sets of explanatory variables using 
the first approach.12 All estimates are carried out by pooled OLS. To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we have also run regressions with fixed-effects. However, the test for the null hypothesis 
that all fixed effects are equal to zero was not rejected. Consequently, we only present the results 
                                                 
12 A percentage of firms present negative profits in some years. It implies that the sum of the variable cost shares in sales 
exceed the unity. We have dropped the extreme values corresponding to the first percentile.  
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corresponding to pooled estimations.13 As we explained in Section 2.2, this approach allows us to 
estimate consistently markups without an instrumental variables procedure. However, in all the 
estimations we have included the variation of capacity utilization to control the cyclical difference 
between the primal and the dual residual when there is excess of capacity. As expected, the 
coefficient of this variable is positive and very robust across all the estimations. Additionally, time 
dummies are also included in all the estimations to capture time-specific effects and they are jointly 
significant. By contrast, industry dummies are not significant and they are not included. 
 
Following the standard approach of the IMD hypothesis, we start by considering the industry import ratio 
as a proxy for foreign competitive pressure (Table 2). As can be seen in column 1, the industrial average 
of import ratio negatively affects the markup, confirming such a hypothesis. The average import ratio for 
all manufacturing industries is 0.094. This implies that the average markup for all firms is about 0.164. 
These results are consistent with previous international evidence such as Konings et al. (2005) and 
Konings and Vandenbussche (2005). The next columns in Table 2 allow us to assess whether this result 
can be generalized for all types of imported goods. Column 2 introduces the interaction of industrial 
average imports with the two dummy variables that proxy final and intermediate goods, respectively. As 
can be seen, the negative effect associated to external competitive pressure is bigger for final goods: the 
value of the coefficient is -0.160. This implies that the average markup for a final good importer is about 
0.150. As we expected, when we consider intermediate imports the pro-efficiency effect of this type of 
imports outweighs the pro-competitive effect of the external pressure. As can be seen, the coefficient 
for this interaction is non-significant.  The average markup for an intermediate good importer is about 
0.168. The coefficient turns positive although non-significant for linked imports of intermediate goods 
(Column 3). These results support our main hypothesis about the relevance of distinguishing between 
final and intermediate goods for testing the IMD hypothesis. Though competitive pressures of imports 
still remain for final goods, imports of intermediate goods do not seem to affect mark-up.  
 
Although most of the empirical literature measures imports at the industry level, we can test the effect of 
imports on markups using individual data. The estimated parameters, presented in Table 3, jointly 
support the previous results. Foreign competitive pressure plays a significant role in the case of final 
                                                 
13 The estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
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goods. As can be seen in Column 2, markups are reduced from 0.172 of non-importers to 0.146 for final 
goods importers. However, the impact of the import ratio on margins is smaller for firms that import 
intermediate goods (the coefficient of the interactions goes from -0.142 to -0.058). This implies that the 
markup for intermediate goods importers is about 0.164. For these firms, international competition 
seems to have a depressing effect on marginal costs which partially outweighs the negative effect on 
prices.14 These results suggest that the importer premia is partially passed through to markups. As can 
be seen in Column 3, the coefficient of the interaction for linked imports of intermediate goods is non-
significant. This result can be influenced, as we explained in section 3, by the fact that there is a reduced 
number of these firms which, in addition, have the biggest import ratio.  
 
Table 4 explores additional information about the effect of product differentiation on markups. The 
variable that approaches the degree of product differentiation takes value 1 if the firm declares that its 
products are highly standardized, and zero otherwise. As can be seen in Column 1, it has a direct 
negative effect on margins and the coefficient is significant at 10%. The rest of columns analyze the 
interaction between the import ratio and the degree of product differentiation. We expect a negative sign 
for the interaction term insofar as competitive pressures of imports are higher when products are more 
homogeneous. The results presented in Columns 2 and 3 confirm that hypothesis: the IMD effect is 
stronger when imports are carried out by firms that produce highly homogenous goods, especially for 
final good imports. Specifically, the markup for final good importers that produce non-differentiated goods 
is 0.141.   
 
Table 5 complements previous results introducing other variables related to the degree of domestic 
competition. Specifically, we use the weighted market share reported by firms and the weighted 
concentration rate (CR4) in markets in which firms compete. As expected, Columns 1 and 2 show that 
both variables positively affect average markups. Unlike Konings et al. (2005) who obtain a negative 
effect of the interaction between concentration and international pressure for Bulgaria and Romania 
during their privatization restructuring process in the nineties, the interactions between market share and 
CR4 and the import ratio are non-significant.  
                                                 
14 There is empirical evidence that supports a positive relationship between productivity and imports of intermediate goods. 
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4.2 Firm-level estimations of markups. 
A clear advantage of the procedure proposed by Roeger (1995) to estimate markups is that it requires a 
small number of explanatory variables. This feature, along with the availability of a long time period, 
allows us to estimate individual markups. Specifically, we estimate equation (5a) for 885  firms with more 
than nine observations. This approach may be seen as a complementary way to test the IMD 
hypothesis. The average markup for these firms is 0.184, which is very similar to the results presented in 
previous estimations. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the dispersion is large and the distribution is 
slightly skewed, with a large proportion of firms on the right tail.   
 
 
Departing from these firm-specific estimations, we compare the distribution of markups between 
different groups of firms according to the type of imports and we perform tests of equality of means and 
tests of equality of distributions (see Figure 2 and Table 6). Firstly, Graph i compares the distribution of 
importers and non-importers. As can be seen in the first line of Table 6, the null hypothesis of equality 
between the average margins and distributions can not be rejected. Although the number of non 
importers is small, this result suggests that there is not a negative correlation between imports and 
markups. To further explore this relationship, we test whether it is affected by import intensity. We define 
intensive importers as those firms with an import ratio bigger than the 75th percentile (17.7%).  As can be 
seen in Graph iii, the distribution of markups for these firms is slightly on the left with respect to the other 
importers. The tests presented in Table 6 not only reject the equality of average markups between both 
groups but also the equality of distributions. With respect to non-importers (Graph ii), although intensive 
importers present a smaller average markup, we can not reject the equality of both distributions.   
 
Additionally, we split the sample according to the type of imported goods. Specifically, we compare  final 
good importers with other importers and non-importers. As can be seen in Graphs iv and v, the 
distribution of markups for firms that import final goods is located on the left with respect to other 
importers, though it seems that there are no differences with respect to non-importers. This is supported 
by the test presented on Table 6: we can not reject the equality of the distributions between final good 
importers and non-importers, but we reject the equality with respect to other importers. Graph vi presents 
the results when product differentiation is considered. The distribution of markups for final importers that 
produce homogeneous goods is clearly on the left with respect to the rest of firms. The markup of these 
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firms is significantly smaller than the others. Therefore, though the econometric approach is different to 
standard pooled regressions, the results confirm those previously obtained. 
 
4.3 Joint estimation of the markup and union bargaining power.  
In this section we relax the assumption of perfect competition in the labor market that was previously 
held. Table 7 shows the estimation results for equation (6b) with different sets of explanatory variables. 
The first two columns present the estimates of the markups with and without controlling for the 
bargaining power of workers. Column 1 shows that the average markup in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry is around 0.164. This value increases to 0.176 when imperfect competition in the labor market is 
taken into account (Column 2). As in previous empirical evidence, we find that ignoring bargaining 
between unions and employers underestimates the estimated markup. The latter value is slightly larger 
than those obtained by Estrada (2009) using the same methodology but with industry data instead of firm 
data.15 He finds a Lerner index of 0.136 for Spanish industries in the period 1970-2004. Our result is also 
in line with Boulhol et al. (2006), who obtain an average estimated Lerner index of around 0.20 for the 
UK manufacturing industry.  
 
The average price over marginal cost associated to the estimated Lerner index (0.176) is 1.214. This 
result is in keeping with earlier works in other countries. For example, Abrahams et al. (2009) and 
Dobbeleare (2004) report an average markup of 1.35 and 1.49 for Belgian manufacturing, respectively. 
For French firms, Dobbeleare and Mairesse (2008) and Crépon et al. (2002) estimate an average 
markup of 1.20 and 1.42, respectively.  
 
As can be seen in Column 2, the variable which accounts for workers bargaining power is strongly 
significant. The estimated union bargaining power for the manufacturing industry is about 0.13-0.15.16 
This result indicates that workers influence employment and wage and, in this sense, bargained wages 
can be outside of the labor demand curve. It is also consistent with previous papers, although it reflects 
that the bargaining power of unions in Spain seems to be slightly smaller than in some other European 
                                                 
15 The estimation is also consistent with the results found by Moreno and Rodríguez (2010) using a structural approach.  
16 The estimated standard errors for φ  of the estimated parameters are computed using the Delta Method: ˆˆ 2ˆˆ ˆ(1 )γφ
σσ γ= + . 
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countries.17 For example, for Belgian firms, Dobbelaere (2004) obtains a parameter of 0.244  while the 
estimated bargaining power presented in Abrahams et al. (2009) ranges from 0.117 to 0.369, without 
(with) materials as variable input, respectively. Both Crépon et al. (2002) and Boulhol et al. (2006) obtain 
larger estimated union bargaining power (0.66 for French firms and 0.4 for English firms, respectively). 
 
To analyze the heterogeneity among sectors, we have estimated equation (6b) for 20 manufacturing 
sectors without considering the interactions with other variables.18 The estimated Lerner index ranges 
from 0.089 to 0.296, which implies that the price- marginal cost ratio ranges from 1.098 to 1.420. 
Comparing the estimated index Lerner and the average of import ratio for the 20 industries (see Figure 
3) we obtain a negative correlation of -0.46, which is consistent with our previous estimations of the 
industry as a whole.  Additionally, the heterogeneity of the union bargaining power among industries is 
bigger than previously obtained for markups. The estimated values for the other sectors range from 
0.144 to 0.423, but we do not find significant parameters in the “Meat industry”, “Other food and 
tobacco”, “Ferrous and non-ferrous metals”, “Printing products” and “Office and data processing 
machinery”.  
 
Figure 4 shows the scatter for both estimated parameters across industries. As can be seen, those 
sectors with a larger Lerner index are often those sectors with stronger union bargaining power. The 
correlation between the two groups of parameters is 0.49. Industries such as “Non-metallic mineral 
products”, “Metal products”, “Beverages”, “Paper” and “Agricultural and industrial machinery” present 
markups and union bargaining power that are above the overall average of the industry. This result 
suggests a bigger capacity of the unions to negotiate bigger wages in industries where the markup is 
high.  
 
Column 3 of Table 7 shows the interaction of the import ratio with the markup and the bargaining power 
terms. That is, we test if international competition is also associated with lower union bargaining power. 
The comparison of this estimation with the results in Column 1 of Table 3 supports the relevance of 
considering imperfect competition in the labour market. The markups for non-importing firms increases 
                                                 
17 This result differs from those obtained by Estrada (2009) using industry-aggregated data. He only found union bargaining power 
in service sectors as a whole, whereas he did not find evidence of worker power for manufacturing. 
18 For this estimation, we have eliminated all the observations with negative profits. 
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by more than 8%, attaining a value of 0.186. Therefore, even controlling for the union bargaining power, 
the IMD hypothesis works for Spanish manufacturing firms. With respect to the interaction with the 
bargaining power term, although the coefficient presents an expected negative sign, it is non-
significant.19 This result differs with Abraham et al. (2009), who find a negative effect of import 
penetration in both markups and union bargaining power, although only for imports from low-wage 
countries. However, Boulhol et al. (2006) obtain the opposite result: they only obtain a negative 
relationship between the estimated markups and union bargaining power for imports from developed 
countries. They argue that this type of imports is surely intra-industry, so it is a better candidate for the 
pro-competitive effects on markups. The last column of Table 7 includes an additional interaction to 
distinguish according to the type of imports. As can be seen, we confirm the previous results with perfect 
labor competition. The negative impact of the import ratio on markup is larger for final good importers. 
Specifically, the markup for intermediated and final good importers is 0.174 and 0.155, respectively.  
 
 
To explore more carefully the relationship between union bargaining power and globalization, we have 
analyzed whether the relationship is affected by the degree of differentiation produced by the firm. Table 
8 repeats the estimations of Table 4 taking into account the bargaining power term. As can be seen in 
Column 1, the coefficient increases their significance: firms that produce homogeneous goods not only 
present smaller markups but also lower union bargaining power. Specifically, the union bargaining power 
for firms with differentiated product is 0.179, a number that is 31% bigger than the average of the 
industry as a whole. The estimations with the interactions of the degree of differentiation with the import 
ratio and import ratio of final goods are showed, respectively, in the last two columns of Table 8. As in 
the previous results, we confirm that the negative effect of international competition is even larger when 
imports are carried out by firms that produce homogenous goods, especially, for final good imports. 
Additionally, in this case, we find that the interaction with the bargaining term is also negative and 
significant. The effect of the import ratio for firms that produce homogeneous goods is negative: the 
union bargaining power of these firms is 0.116 instead of 0.149 for the rest of firm. The impact is even 
more negative when we consider final importers: the value in this case is 0.065. This suggests that 
unions have more restrictions to negotiate larger rent sharing in industries where the degree of 
                                                 
19 As in the previous estimations, the null hypothesis that the individual effects are equal to zero can not be rejected. For this 
reason, we only present the OLS pooled estimation. However in the fixed effects estimations, the estimated parameter is 
negative and significant at the 10%.   
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differentiation is lower and that these difficulties increase when these industries are more exposed to 
international competition.  
 
 
5. Conclusions. 
The negative effect of import competition on domestic markups has been a well-founded result in 
empirical literature for many years. Similar arguments have been suggested to predict a negative effect 
of market integration on domestic workers’ bargaining power. This paper analyzes jointly both 
perspectives, while paying special attention to the specific effect of intermediate imports on product and 
labour market imperfections. The estimation of markups departs from the procedure suggested by 
Roeger (1995) and it introduces union power by means of an efficient bargaining model.  
 
The results are highly robust irrespective of the empirical strategy followed, which includes pooled and 
firm-specific regressions. Additionally, market imperfections are introduced consecutively, which 
allows us to asses the biases that emerge in the estimation of markups when union bargaining power 
is not considered. The results strongly support the negative effect of imports, with independence of 
whether they are measured at the firm or industry level. However, the distinction between the types of 
imported goods points out that the IMD hypothesis is more relevant for final goods. By contrast, when 
offshoring activities are considered, productivity gains seem to outweigh partially the pro-competitive 
effect of international competition. The negative effect for final-goods oriented imports, both on 
markups and union bargaining power, is larger the more homogeneous are goods elaborated by firms. 
Finally, we show that both measures of market imperfections are highly correlated. Those industries 
with higher markups also show larger imperfections in labour markets, proxied by union bargaining 
power. Overall, these results support the positive effects of market integration policies, measured here 
through import activity, in reducing market imperfections. However, these effects crucially depend on 
the nature of imported goods. The increasing role of intermediate imports in world trade flows 
suggests that not all economic integration across countries necessarily reduces domestic market 
imperfections.   
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Appendix: Variables definition. 
 
Capital stock of equipment goods: It is net stock of capital for equipment goods in real terms. It is 
calculated by using the perpetual inventory formula: 1 1(1 ) ( / )δ − −= − +t t t t tK K P P I , where P is the price 
index for equipment, δ  is the depreciation rate, and I is the investment in equipment. 
 
Concentration: Surveyed firms give annual information about markets served (up to five), identifying 
their market share and the market share of main competitors. From this information a CR4 index is 
calculated summing up market shares of four main competitors in each market. Later, a weighted 
concentration index is calculated for each firm using as weighting the proportions of sales in each 
market with respect to total sales.  
 
Degree of product homogeneity: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the product supplied by the firm 
is highly standardized.  As in the rest of variables, this information is reported by the firm.  
 
Market share: The surveyed firms give annual information about markets served (up to five), 
identifying their market share. A zero market share is assigned when firms define their market shares 
as insignificant. The weighted market share is calculated using the proportions with respect to total 
sales in each market.  
 
Utilization of capacity: Variation in the percentage of utilization of installed capacity reported by the 
firm.  
 
Classification of imports  
 
The database includes information about the volume of imports for each firm and year, but it does not 
give explicit information about the type of imported goods (final or intermediate). Nevertheless, it 
includes complementary information that helps us to classify the import. Specifically, each firm 
declares the percentage of foreign ownership and the percentage of sales of commercialized products 
not elaborated by the firm and that come from abroad. Additionally, importers provide information 
about the percentage of imports coming from foreign companies with which the firm has 
commercialization and distribution agreements or that participate in the firm’s capital (linked imports). 
When such imports exist, firms declare whether they are similar goods to those produced by them. As 
can be seen in Table A1, only 10% (15%) of all observations (observations with positive imports) are 
associated to linked imports. This percentage is almost 25% (40%) in the case of product 
commercialized by the firm coming from abroad.   
 
We assume that firms that do not have linked imports but which commercialize imported product not 
elaborated by themselves should be final importers. Even when they have linked imports, we also 
consider that the imported goods are final if firms declare that these imported goods are not similar to 
those produced by the firms. Almost 20% of the firms are included in this category.   
 
We consider that most of the rest of firms only import intermediate goods (intermediate goods). 
However, using the available information, it is also possible to classify the linked imports that are 
intermediate goods.  Specifically, when a firm has imported from foreign companies with which the 
firm has commercialization and distribution agreements or which participate in the firm’s capital and 
declare that these imports are not similar to those elaborated by them. Some of them commercialize 
products not elaborated by them and that come from abroad.  
 
Accordingly, we define the types of imports as: 
 
Final Goods Imports: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has commercialized products not 
elaborated by themselves and that come from abroad and if the firm does not have linked imports. It 
also takes value 1 if the firm imports from foreign companies with which it has commercialization and 
distribution agreements but it defines this linked imports as imported goods that are similar to those 
elaborated by the firm in the domestic market.  
 
Linked Intermediate Goods Imports: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has imported from 
foreign companies with which the firm has commercialization and distribution agreements or which 
participate in the firm’s capital and declare that these imports are not similar to those elaborated by 
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them. Some of them are commercialized products not elaborated by themselves and that come from 
abroad.  
 
 
Table A1: Classification of imports  
 
 
Sales of commercialized products not elaborated by the firm and that come 
from abroad 
 
 
 
=0 >0 
 
= 0 
Import=0         Import>0       
6603                 7195 
Final: 2679 
 
Imports from foreign companies 
with which the firm has 
commercialization and 
distribution agreements or 
which participate in the firm’s 
capital  
 > 0 
 
Non-similar         
Linked Interm.: 385   
 
Similar 
129 
 
Non-Similar 
Linked Interm.: 927 
 
Similar 
Final: 946 
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Table 1  
 
  Percentage of importer firms 
 
Import ratio for importer firms 
 
All 
 
(A) 
Final 
goods 
(B) 
 
Intermediate 
goods 
(A) – (B) 
 
Linked 
intermediate 
goods 
(C) 
All 
 
(D) 
Final 
goods 
(E) 
 
Intermediate 
goods 
(D) - (E) 
Linked 
intermediate 
goods 
(F) 
1991 57.5 17.8 40.5 7.8 12.2 15.2 11.0 20.6 
1992 56.6 19.5 38.3 7.8 13.3 16.1 12.0 23.3 
1993 57.9 18.8 39.6 6.8 12.6 16.0 11.0 19.0 
1994 61.5 18.0 44.4 8.5 13.7 17.8 12.1 23.6 
1995 63.7 18.9 44.9 8.7 15.1 19.0 13.4 23.6 
1996 65.0 19.0 46.6 9.2 15.2 19.3 13.5 23.8 
1997 65.7 18.4 47.6 8.9 14.5 18.8 12.9 22.5 
1998 65.3 18.1 47.5 7.5 15.3 20.2 13.5 23.5 
1999 67.7 19.5 48.7 7.6 15.5 19.0 14.2 26.4 
2000 66.7 18.1 48.9 7.5 15.9 20.0 14.4 25.8 
2001 66.4 18.4 48.5 7.0 15.3 18.3 14.2 24.7 
2002 67.8 20.1 48.0 3.6 14.7 17.6 13.5 28.8 
2003 67.8 20.5 47.6 4.4 14.6 17.6 13.4 26.9 
2004 66.7 20.9 46.2 3.5 15.1 19.2 13.3 29.8 
2005 67.0 21.7 45.8 4.0 16.2 20.2 14.4 29.8 
Average 64.3 19.1 45.7 6.9 14.7 18.3 13.2 24.2 
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Table 2 
Markups and industrial imports  
OLS pooled estimation 
[ ] [ ] 20051 2 3
1991
it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX AMR dX AMR Type dUC TDβ β β δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.177*** 
(0.006) 
0.168*** 
(0.004) 
0.168*** 
(0.004) 
Effect of  import ratio ( 2β ) -0.143*** 
(0.054)   
Effect of  final goods import ratio ( 3β )  -0.160*** (0.060) 
-0.160*** 
(0.060) 
Effect of intermediate goods import  ratio ( 3β )  -0.028 (0.046) 
-0.037 
(0.050) 
Effect of linked intermediate goods import: ratio( 3β )   0.020 (0.089) 
Utilization of capacity(δ ) 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
Wald test - Time Dummies 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wald test - Fixed effects 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Mark-ups for all importer firms 0,164   
Mark-ups for firms which import final goods  0,150 0,150 
Mark-ups for firms which import intermediate goods  0.168 0.168 
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
17749 
(2519) 
17749 
(2519) 
17749 
(2519) 
 
Notes:   
- AMRit refers to the industry average of the import ratio. Typeit refers to dummies that classified firms according 
their type of import: final, intermediate or linked intermediate goods. 
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Table 3 
Markups and firm-level imports  
OLS pooled estimation 
[ ] [ ] 20051 2 3
1991
it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX MR dX MR Type dUC TDβ β β δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.172*** (0.003) 
0.172*** 
(0.003) 
0.172*** 
(0.003) 
Effect of  import ratio ( 2β ) -0.090*** 
(0.019)   
Effect of  final goods import ratio ( 3β ) 
 
-0.142*** 
(0.028) 
-0.143*** 
(0.028) 
Effect of intermediate goods import ratio ( 3β )  -0.058** 
(0.023) 
-0.062** 
(0.026) 
Effect of linked intermediate goods  import ratio ( 3β )   -0.046 
(0.040) 
Utilization of capacity (δ ) 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
 
Wald test - Time Dummies  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wald test - Fixed effects 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Mark-ups for all importers  firms 0.163   
Mark-ups for firms which import final goods  0.146 0.146 
 
Markups for firms which import intermediate goods  0.164 
 
0.165 
 
Number of observations (Number of firms) 17767 
(2519) 
17767 
(2519) 
17767 
(2519) 
 
Notes:   
- MRit refers to the import ratio of the firm. Typeit refers to dummies that classified firms according their type of 
import: final, intermediate or linked intermediate goods. 
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Table 4 
Markups and firm-level imports: the effects of product differentiation 
OLS pooled estimation 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 20051 2 3 4
1991
it it it it it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX HP dX MR HP dX MR HP Type dUC TDβ λ λ λ δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × × + × × × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.170*** 
(0.004) 
0.171*** 
(0.003) 
0.167*** 
(0.003) 
Effect of non-differentiated products ( 2λ ) -0.009* 
(0.006) 
  
Effect of import ratio for firms with non-differentiated 
products ( 3λ )  
-0.120*** 
(0.022) 
 
Effect of final goods import ratio for firms with non-
differentiated products ( 4λ )  
 -0.145*** 
(0.031) 
Utilization of capacity (δ ) 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
Wald test - Time Dummies  0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
Wald test - Fixed effects 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Markups for firms with non-differentiated products 0.164   
Markups for importer firms with non-differentiated 
products  0.159  
Markups for firms with non-differentiated products and 
which  import  final goods   0.141 
Number of observations (Number of firms) 17758 
(2519) 
17758 
(2519) 
17758 
(2519) 
 
       Notes:   
- MRit refers to the import ratio of the firm. HPit refers to dummies that classified the firms according to the degree of the 
standardization of their product and Typeit refers to a dummy that define final goods importers.  
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Table 5  
Markups and firm-level imports: the effects of market share and concentration 
OLS pooled estimation 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 20051 2 2 3
1991
( 4 ) ( 4 )it it it it it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX MR dX MS CR dX MR MS CR dUC TDβ β λ λ δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × + × × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.159*** 
(0.003) 
0.161*** 
(0.007) 
0.173*** 
(0.003) 
0.177*** 
(0.005) 
Effect of  import ratio ( 2β )   -0.107*** 
(0.025) 
-0.148*** 
(0.047) 
Effect of  market share of the firm ( 2λ ) 0.052*** 
(0.015) 
   
Effect of  concentration( 2λ )  0.020* 
(0.012) 
  
Effect of  import ratio controlling for market share ( 3λ )   0.108 
(0.080) 
 
Effect of  import ratio controlling for concentration ( 3λ )    0.089 
(0.072) 
Utilization of capacity (δ ) 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
Wald test - Time Dummies  0.0 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Number of observations (Number of firms) 16267 
(2468) 
6463 
(1600) 
16267 
(2468) 
6463 
(1600) 
 
Notes:   
- MRit refers to the import ratio of the firm. MSit refers to market share and CR4it to concentration index.  
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Table 6  
Mark-ups differences according the type of imports 
 
 Number 
of firms 
 
Average  
mark-ups  
 
Test of 
equality of 
average 
 
Test of 
difference 
of average 
is negative 
Test of 
equality of 
distributions 
 
Importers   729 0.182  (0.165) 
Non importers 156 0.191 (0.162) 
 
0.543 
 
0.271 0.668 
Intensive importers  185 0.161  (0.160) 
Non importers 156 0.191 (0.162) 
 
0.084 
 
0.042 0.112 
Intensive importers  185 0.161 (0.160) 
Other importers 544 0.189 (0.167) 
 
0.041 
 
0.021 0.022 
Final importers 331 0.173 (0.160) 
Non importers  147 0.194 (0.165) 
 
0.194 
 
0.097 0.262 
Final importers   331 0.173 (0.160) 
Other importers  398 0.190 (0.170) 
 
0.176 
 
0.088 0.023 
Final importers with 
homogeneous products 288 0.169 (0.159) 
Rest of firms 597 0.191 (0.168) 
 
 
0.056 
 
 
0.028 0.025 
 
Notes:   
- In the test of equality (or difference) the p-value is presented.  
- The test of equality of distributions is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  
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Table 7  
Markups, union bargaining power and firm-level imports 
OLS pooled estimation 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 20051 2 3 1 2
1991
it it it it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX MR dX MR Type dN dN MR dUC TDβ β β γ γ δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × × + ⋅ + × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.164*** 
(0.003) 
0.176*** 
(0.003) 
0.186*** 
(0.004) 
0.186** 
(0.004) 
Effect of  import ratio ( 2β )   
 
-0.115*** 
(0.022) 
 
Effect of  final goods import ratio ( 3β )    -0.166*** 
(0.030) 
Effect of intermediate goods  import ratio ( 3β )    -0.083*** 
(0.025) 
Bargaining term ( 1γ )  0.151*** 
(0.023) 
0.178*** 
(0.026) 
0.177*** 
(0.026) 
Effect of  import ratio on bargaining ( 2γ )   -0.295 
(0.188) 
-0.292 
(0.188) 
Utilization of capacity (δ ) 
 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
Wald test - Time Dummies  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wald test - Fixed effects 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Bargaining power for non-importers  ( itφ )  0.131 
(0.017) 
0.151 
(0.018) 
0.151 
(0.017) 
Mark-ups for importers  firms   0.175  
Mark-ups for firms which import final goods    0.155 
 
Markups for firms which import intermediate 
goods 
   0.174 
 
Number of observations 
 (Number of firms) 
17767 
(2519) 
17767 
(2519) 
17767 
(2519) 
17767 
(2519) 
 
Notes:   
- MRit refers to the import ratio of the firm. Typeit refers to dummies that classified firms according their type of 
import: final, intermediate or linked intermediate goods. 
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Table 8 
Markups, bargaining power and firm-level imports: the effects of product differentiation 
OLS pooled estimation 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
1 2 3 4 1
2005
2 3 4
1991
it it it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it it it t t it
t
dY dX dX HP dX MR HP dX MR HP Type dN
dN HP dN MR HP dN MR HP Type dUC TD
β λ λ λ γ
η η η δ α ε
=
= ⋅ + × + × × + × × × + ⋅
+ × + × × + × × × + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Markup ( 1β ) 0.186*** 
(0.005) 
0.185*** 
(0.004) 
0.180*** 
(0.003) 
Effect of non-differentiated products ( 2λ ) -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
  
Effect of import ratio for firms with non-differentiated 
products ( 3λ )  
-0.151*** 
(0.025) 
 
Effect of final goods import ratio for firms with non-
differentiated products ( 4λ )  
 -0.180*** 
(0.035) 
Bargaining term ( 1γ ) 0.218*** 
(0.036) 
0.175*** 
(0.025) 
0.163*** 
(0.024) 
Effect of non-differentiated products ( 2η ) -0.114** 
(0.047) 
  
Effect of import ratio for firms with non-differentiated 
products: ( 3η )  
-0.439** 
(0.217) 
 
Effect of final goods import ratio for firms with non-
differentiated products ( 4η )  
 -0.527** 
(0.277) 
Utilization of capacity (δ ) 
 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
Wald test - Time Dummies  0.0 0.0 
 
 
Wald test - Fixed effects 
0.83 
0.83 0.83 
Bargaining power for referred group: itφ  0.179 
(0.024) 
0.149 
(0.018) 
0.140 
(0.015) 
Number of observations (Number of firms) 17758 
(2519) 
17758 
(2519) 
17758 
(2519) 
 
Notes:   
- MRit refers to the import ratio of the firm. HPit refers to dummies that classified the firms according to the degree 
of the standardization of their product and Typeit refers to a dummy that define final goods importers  
- Estimated standard error in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
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Figure 1 
Markups distribution  
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Figure 2 
Markups distribution: Kernel density estimates  
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 Figure 3 
Markups (Lerner index) and Import ratio across industries 
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Figure 4 
Markups (Lerner index) and Union Bargaining Power across industries 
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1 Meat related products 11 Non-metal mineral products 
2 Food and tobacco 12 Basic metal products 
3 Beverages 13 Fabricated metal products 
4 Textiles and clothing 14 Industrial and agricultural equipment 
5 Leather, fur and footwear 15 Office mach., data proc., precision instr. and similar 
6 Timber 16 Electric materials and accessories 
7 Paper 17 Vehicles and motors 
8 Printing and publishing 18 Other transport equipment 
9 Chemicals 19 Furniture 
10 Plastic and rubber products 20 Miscellaneous 
 
